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Civilian and Military Genetics:
Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA World
Susannah Baruch1,* and Kathy Hudson1Evidence is emerging of a growing societal consensus about appro-
priate and inappropriate uses of genetic information. The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 provides new legal
protections to Americans by prohibiting the discriminatory use
of genetic information by health insurers and employers. Addi-
tionally, the United States military recently created new policies
for fair use of genetic information in the determination of beneﬁts
for servicemen and servicewomen leaving military service.
Although critical issues remain, such as the potential for genetic
information to be used to deny people other forms of insurance,
and how the military will use genetic medicine overall, signiﬁcant
progress has been made.
Introduction: GINA, Health, and Society
After more than 12 years of consideration by Congress,
a new federal law has been enacted aimed at quelling
a deep fear of millions of Americans—that information
about their genetic makeup could be used by health in-
surers and employers to discriminate against them. The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (commonly
known as GINA) prohibits health insurers and employers
from asking or requiring a person to take a genetic test
and from using genetic information in setting insurance
rates or making employment decisions.1 GINA prevents
health insurers from denying coverage or adjusting pre-
miums on the basis of genetic information, or from
requesting that an individual undergo a genetic test. For
the 175 million Americans in the group health-insurance
market, this new law augments protections already
afforded under the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act by prohibiting cost increases for a group
based on the genetic information of group members.
And for the one in four Americans who will buy or attempt
to buy individual health insurance in the next three years,2
GINA provides new and comprehensive federal protection
from the use of genetic information for underwriting. In
addition, the new law prohibits employers from using
genetic information to make hiring, ﬁring, or promotion
decisions and sharply limits their ability to request,
require, or purchase an employee’s genetic information.
President George W. Bush signed GINA into law on May
21, 2008. Federal agencies are currently writing the regula-
tions that will implement the new law; all provisions of the
law are slated to be in effect by November 21, 2009.
Many clinicians, researchers, and patients are still
unclear about what GINA does and does not accomplishand what it means for them. Although GINA does not
answer every concern facing individuals contemplating
genetic testing, it goes a long way toward removing fears
that have dogged the delivery and translation of genetics
in both healthcare and research. Until now, protection
from the collection and use of genetic information by
health insurers and employers came only from a patchwork
of state and federal laws and regulations. As research into
human genetics advances at a rapid pace, GINA is a neces-
sary and laudable policy response to the ongoing revolu-
tion in genetics and human health.
To be sure, some have criticized GINA as narrow and
limited in scope.3 GINA is, like most enacted laws, a com-
promise and reﬂects a strategic and delicate balancing of
interests of all key stakeholders including providers,
patients, insurers, employers, researchers, and lawmakers.
Technically speaking, GINA amends laws that are them-
selves compromises, and many of the critiques of GINA,
closely examined, are actually critiques of the underlying
laws or policies. For example, GINA prohibits insurers in
the individual market from using genetic information to
determine an individual’s eligibility for health insurance
or to set his or her premium—but it does not prohibit
underwriting altogether. This means that individuals
with genetic diseases, like individuals with diseases with-
out a known genetic basis, may continue to have a difﬁcult
time obtaining affordable health insurance in the
individual market.
Overall, GINA’s passage is strong evidence of a growing
societal consensus that discrimination on the basis of our
genes is simply unfair, given the many complicated health
risks—genetic and environmental, knowable and unknow-
able, controllable and uncontrollable—that we all face. It
took more than 12 years for GINA to pass, but when it
ﬁnally overcame the opposition of a few members of Con-
gress who controlled the rules of the House and Senate for
many years, it passed almost unanimously, with strong
bipartisan support.
GINA’s lasting legacy, however, may be seen as much in
its reﬂection of emerging social consensus about the appro-
priate and inappropriate uses of genetic information as in
its legal reach per se. As further evidence—albeit less well
publicized—of this growing consensus, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense recently began a dramatic transformation
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of genetic information in themilitary. These changes come
as advances in our understanding of genetics have led the
military to consider how genetic testingmight best be used
to maximize effective training and stafﬁng of the armed
forces in wartime.
Why GINA?
Researchers in human genetics, geneticists, and other
healthcare providers, as well as many patients, know well
how important GINA’s passage really is. For many years,
patients who might have beneﬁted from genetic testing
avoided it—or obtained it anonymously or under assumed
names—out of concern about possible repercussions. The
fear of genetic discrimination has affected both individual
health care and clinical research to their detriment. When
people opt not to be tested or keep their results secret, they
put themselves in serious danger by losing the opportunity
to seekmonitoring and preventive care to avoid conditions
for which they are at heightened risk. In one recent case,
parents who were aware of a Factor V Leiden mutation in
their family (a condition that raises the risk of blood clots)
were advised that their daughter should not have a genetic
test for the condition until legislation protecting against
genetic discrimination passed. Subsequently, the young
girl almost died from a massive clot. Fortunately, she sur-
vived and is expected to recover.4 But cases like this dra-
matically illustrate the dangers inherent in the fear of ge-
netic discrimination and ultimately inspired the near-
unanimous passage of GINA in Congress.
GINA beneﬁts genetic research as well as individuals.
Linking gene variants to health outcomes often requires
studies involving large numbers of people, but scientists
long have reported that potential research participants
have been deterred by fears that their information could
be used against them by employers and insurers. This
fear has presented serious obstacles to research. Consent
forms and counseling of research participants necessarily
have included warnings that participants may experience
genetic discrimination in the future.5–8 Now, scientists
and researchers can assure study participants that neither
their participation in a research study nor their genetic
information legally can be used against them by their
employers or health insurers.
At times during Congressional deliberations, health in-
surers stated that GINA was unnecessary on the grounds
that they do not use genetic information in underwriting
or coverage decision and that widespread public concern
about genetic discrimination is baseless. However, key
work published by researchers at Georgetown University
during the ﬁnal months of Congress’ deliberations showed
otherwise.9 In the study, individual health insurers were
asked to medically underwrite pairs of hypothetical appli-
cants. Each pair differed only in whether they had
received a genetic test result indicating elevated risk of fu-
ture disease or had received genetic services such as coun-
seling about treatment options to reduce inherited disease
risk. A substantial number of medical underwriters indi-436 The American Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, Octobecated that they would deny coverage, charge higher pre-
miums, or impose exclusion riders to limit covered beneﬁts
based on genetic information or receipt of genetic services.
This is an extraordinary time for human genetics. More
than 1300 genetic tests are available clinically now, any in-
dividual can obtain genetic testing (of various scope, value,
and legitimacy) over the Internet, and our understanding
of the links between genes and health is expanding, partic-
ularly through the use of genome-wide association studies.
In an online, international registry of clinical trials main-
tained by the National Institutes of Health, at least 1500
of the studies currently listed appear to involve or relate
to genetic testing.
Ethical concerns about potential misuses of genetic
information have proliferated since the beginning of the
Human Genome Project in 1990. A robust body of legal
and policy scholarship has probed the issue of genetic
discrimination against civilians in employment and insur-
ance. Some question the underlying rationale for enacting
special protections for genetic information, sometimes
called genetic exceptionalism.10,11 Others argue that the
predictive nature of genetic information, its implications
for family members, its use historically to support preju-
dice, and heightened public concern about genetic privacy
points to the need for additional protections.12 Other
scholarship has yielded key insights regarding the values
that are threatened—including respect for persons,13,14
privacy,15,16 and equality17—when genetic information is
used to deny someone employment or insurance or place
additional burdens on access to these societal goods.
There is a lengthy history of ethical issues surrounding
genetic testing.18–24 During the 1970s, African Americans
were forced to undergo screening for sickle cell anemia as
a condition for school attendance and marriage licenses,25
and those who tested positive as carriers faced discrimina-
tion in employment, despite the fact that they did not
have the disease.23,25 This led the federal government to
pass the Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act of 1972,26 which
made sickle cell screening voluntary. It also led some states
to pass laws prohibiting the use of speciﬁc recessive genetic
mutations, such as for sickle cell disease and Tay Sachs, in
underwriting decisions.27 These laws were limited in scope
and premised on the fact that actuarial justiﬁcation for
requiring testing of recessive mutations was lacking
because the mutation does not bear on an individual’s
health risk.27
The detrimental impact of fear of genetic discrimination
on individual and public health is well established.28 Em-
pirical research has documented the negative impact this
fear has on an individual’s willingness to utilize genetic
services29–35 or to participate in biomedical research.36 Nu-
merous studies have documented the attitudes and experi-
ences of research participants,32,34 patients,29–31,33,35,37–42
healthcare providers,37,43–47 and the general public48–50
related to genetic discrimination.
In 2004, our own public opinion survey of 4834 Ameri-
cans showed that 80% of respondents felt that healthr 10, 2008
insurers should not have access to an individual’s genetic
test results. Even more (92%) felt that employers should
not have access to such information. Although concern
about privacy did not vary based on most demographic
variables (e.g., sex, age, political afﬁliation), attitudes did
vary by educational level, with more than 97% of respon-
dents with a college education opposing employer ac-
cess.51–53 In 2007, we conducted a related survey of 1199
Americans to assess the level of trust in various individuals
and entities that might have access to genetic information,
views about privacy protection for various types of medical
information (e.g., HIV status, genetic information, mental
health information), and opinions about access to and use
of genetic information by health insurers and employers.
More than three-quarters of respondents believed that
there should be a law that prevents employers from using
genetic test results about risk of future disease to make
decisions about hiring and promotion; three-quarters
also believed there should be a law to prevent health in-
surers from using genetic test results about risk of future
disease to deny or limit insurance or charge higher pri-
ces.51,54,55 These data helped bolster the case for legislative
action and the resolve of federal legislators.
A Legislative History
Concern about genetic discrimination, particularly by
insurers, led to a variety of state laws. In 1991, Wisconsin
became the ﬁrst state to enact a law prohibiting health
insurers from requesting genetic information or using
such information to make eligibility or risk classiﬁcation
decisions. However, comprehensive analyses of the inade-
quacies of many early laws to protect against genetic dis-
crimination56–60 and examples of actual and attempted
discrimination by employers and insurers41,60–64 led to
additional policy proposals, including federal legislative ef-
forts that began in themid-1990s. There have been numer-
ous versions of federal genetic discrimination legislation,
and more than 40 states now restrict the use of genetic in-
formation by insurers. More than 30 states have passed
laws that prohibit genetic discrimination in employment
(see database of state genetic laws online). GINA does not
affect state laws that are more protective. However, state
laws that are less protective than GINA will be trumped
by the new federal law. In many cases, state laws’ deﬁni-
tions of genetic information are narrower than GINA’s:
some do not include family history, and some cover tests
in the research setting and exclude those that become
part of routine clinical practice. Under GINA, state
health-insurance regulations must conform to federal law
by GINA’s effective date, May 21, 2009. After that date, if
states do not have in place protections that meet or exceed
GINA standards, federal enforcement can be triggered.
Before GINA’s passage, a handful of federal laws provided
some limited protection from genetic discrimination in
group health insurance and on the job. In 1996, Congress
passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA),65 which included two speciﬁc provisions put-The Americting in place some restrictions on group health insurers’
use of health-related information in making coverage deci-
sions and setting premiums. Congress speciﬁcally recog-
nized and listed genetic information as protected health
information. HIPAA further states that genetic information
in the absence of a diagnosis (e.g., predictive genetic test
results) cannot be considered a pre-existing condition.
In the workplace setting, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) has interpreted the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)66—in particular its protection
of people who are ‘‘regarded as’’ having a disability67—to
provide some protections from the use of genetic informa-
tion by employers. In one United States Supreme Court
decision, Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court ruled that people
with HIV infection may be covered under the ADA even
if they are free of symptoms. In a dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the argument adopted by the
majority opinion, ‘‘taken to its logical extreme, would
render every individual with a genetic marker for some
debilitating disease ‘disabled’ here and now because of
some future effects.’’68 In part because of that dissenting
opinion, some questioned whether the ADA would in
practice provide meaningful protection against genetic
discrimination if challenged in court.56,69
In 2000, President Clinton evidenced his support for ge-
netic nondiscrimination when he issued Executive Order
13145, To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment
Based onGenetic Information. The Executive Order explic-
itly prohibits discrimination on the basis of protected
genetic information in all aspects of civilian federal gov-
ernment employment and limits federal departments’
and agencies’ access to, and use of, genetic information.70
Both President Clinton and President George W. Bush
strongly supported federal legislation to ban genetic
discrimination in health insurance and employment.70,71
Since the ﬁrst version of GINA was introduced in 1995,
the legislation also had the support of a majority of Con-
gress. Legislation nearly identical to GINA passed the
Senate unanimously in 2003 and 2005. From 2003 to
2006, the Republican Congressional leadership simply re-
fused to allow the legislation to be considered by the House
of Representatives. But with the 2006 election and the
change in control of Congress, GINA began to move rap-
idly toward enactment. After consideration by a total of
four committees of jurisdiction in the House and the
Senate and numerous votes in both chambers, GINA was
ﬁnally enacted by Congress and signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush in 2008.
GINA’s Strengths and Limitations
Hailed bymany as the ﬁrst civil rights legislation of the 21st
century, GINA represents signiﬁcant progress in protecting
civilians from genetic discrimination in employment and
health insurance.1,72 For researchers and research partici-
pants, GINA means that fear of genetic discrimination by
health insurers or employers no longer will be a barrier
to timely progress in genetics research. GINA allowsan Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, October 10, 2008 437
clinicians and researchers to provide reassurance to
patients and research participants that they need not fear
genetic discrimination.
Yet it is also important for researchers, clinicians, and pa-
tients to understand what GINA does not do. For example,
GINA provides no guarantee that health insurers will pay
for particular genetic tests or the medical care, diagnostic
tests, or treatments that a genetic test indicates are appro-
priate. In some circumstances it may be necessary to reveal
a test result or family history to an insurer to provemedical
necessity—for example, if a woman chooses to undergo
a prophylactic removal of her breasts and ovaries because
of a positive BRCA test or a strong family history of breast
and ovarian cancer, the insurer may ask for the family
history information or genetic test result as evidence that
the surgery is medically necessary. However, the insurer
may request only the minimum amount of information
necessary to accomplish the intended purpose. In some
cases, a medical record indicating that a patient is at higher
risk for ovarian cancer based on her own personal history
of cancer may be sufﬁcient.
GINA does not include protection from genetic discrim-
ination in life insurance, disability insurance, or long-
term-care insurance. GINA also does not apply to members
of the United States military, to veterans obtaining health-
care through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), or to
the Indian Health Service because the laws amended by
GINA do not apply to these groups and programs.
Clinicians should note that GINA does not interfere with
the ability of a treating healthcare professional to request
or recommend that an individual or family member
undergo a genetic test. Nor does it limit the authority of
health insurers to notify individuals about genetic tests
or provide information to enrollees about a genetic test.
For example, a geneticist is free to recommend BRCA test-
ing to an individual with a family history of breast and
ovarian cancer. A health insurer may notify all enrollees
of the availability of BRCA testing and provide information
about when such testing may be indicated. But a health
insurer may not request or require that a particular
individual take a genetic test.
Under certain limited circumstances, an employer would
not be held liable under GINA for acquiring genetic infor-
mation. For example, some genetic information may be
collected as part of a toxic monitoring or wellness program
in the workplace, and employers will not be penalized for
inadvertently collecting genetic information (such as
knowledge of the existence of a genetic disease in a family
member) through an employee’s request for leave under
the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Some early versions of GINA included privacy and dis-
crimination protections for individuals with a diagnosed
genetic disease or condition. These proposals essentially
prohibited medical underwriting on the basis of diagnosed
genetic illness, an approach that would have dramatically
changed individual health-insurance market practices and
the U.S. healthcare system. Ultimately this approach was438 The American Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, Octoberdetermined to be outside the core purpose of GINA. Simi-
larly, GINA does not prohibit employment discrimination
on the basis of an already manifest genetic disease—such
circumstances have been and will continue to be handled
under provisions of the ADA.66 Many of GINA’s sponsors
and supporters would have liked to strengthen the existing
legal protections for people with genetic diseases but ulti-
mately felt that it would be unfair to provide such protec-
tion only to people whose diagnosed disease had a known
genetic basis. Such a rule rapidly would have become un-
wieldy and unworkable as individuals would have to prove
the genetic basis of their disease even as our understanding
of the genetic basis of disease continues to evolve. The ﬁnal
version of GINA protects genetic information that predicts
an individual’s risk of disease in the future, as well as the
genetic test results of people already affected by a genetic
disease.72
There have been other concerns raised about GINA,
including the argument that GINA permits excessive shar-
ing of genetic information by applying the privacy rules of
HIPAA to genetic information.73 HIPAA permits data shar-
ing among covered entities without patient consent in
connection with treatment, payment, and oversight of
the healthcare system, often referred to as healthcare
operations. This criticism appears to be primarily based
in a belief that underlying HIPAA privacy regulations are
not strong enough, a limitation that GINA did not attempt
to address. However, GINA does speciﬁcally prohibit
underwriting decisions made on the basis of any genetic
information held by a HIPAA-covered entity.
Deﬁnition of Terms
GINA deﬁnes key terms such as ‘‘genetic information,’’
‘‘genetic services,’’ and ‘‘genetic test.’’
‘‘Genetic information’’ means information about genetic
tests, the genetic tests of family members, and themanifes-
tation of a disease or disorder in family members (a ‘‘family
member’’ is deﬁned as a ﬁrst-, second-, third-, or fourth-de-
gree relative). It also includes any request for, or receipt of,
genetic services, or participation in clinical research that
includes genetic services, by an individual or his or her
family members. ‘‘Genetic services’’ may include a genetic
test, genetic counseling (including obtaining, interpreting,
or assessing genetic information), or genetic education.
The law states speciﬁcally that genetic information does
not include information about sex or age. Further clariﬁca-
tion about the scope of these deﬁnitions is expected
through the federal regulatory process, currently under
way.
The deﬁnition of ‘‘genetic test’’ is quite speciﬁc. Under
GINA, genetic test means an analysis of human DNA,
RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites to detect
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes. However,
according to the law, genetic test does not include:
‘‘(i) an analysis of proteins or metabolites that does
not detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal10, 2008
changes; or (ii) an analysis of proteins or metabolites
that is directly related to a manifested disease, disor-
der, or pathological condition that could reasonably
be detected by a healthcare professional with appro-
priate training and expertise in the ﬁeld of medicine
involved.’’
It is important to note that (ii) does not appear in the
employment section of the law—in the workplace, this
exception to the deﬁnition of genetic test would not apply.
In other words, GINA does not prohibit insurers from un-
derwriting based on information that reveals information
about current health status. However, employers may not
use such information to make employment decisions.
How GINAWill Be Enforced
GINA amends the four federal laws that govern the provi-
sion of health insurance in the United States: the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Public
Health Services Act (PHSA), HIPAA, and the Internal Reve-
nue Code. GINA also was crafted to apply to those
employers covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which bans discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under Title VII,
employers with fewer than 15 employees are not included.
GINA’s enforcement mechanisms and penalties are
consistent with provisions of all of the above laws. Some
earlier versions of the legislation providedmore substantial
penalties for violations. However, during Congressional
deliberation, the bill’s sponsors decided that to mandate
harsher penalties for violations of GINA than for violations
of other privacy and discrimination laws would be an irra-
tional and unfair approach. It also was believed that consis-
tency with other laws would ease the burden on health
insurers and employers in complying with the bill and
help ensure its passage. The law will be enforced by federal
agencies including the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Department of Labor (DOL), and the
EEOC. In addition, relief may be available to individuals
under state laws that are stronger than GINA.
Imagine a woman, Irene, who believes she has experi-
enced genetic discrimination. If she has been denied an
individual health-insurance policy and wishes to seek
enforcement under GINA, she would be well advised to
go ﬁrst to her state health-insurance agency for assistance:
States may have laws that are at least as protective as those
required by GINA. Many are expected to pass such laws in
order to maintain their enforcement jurisdiction. HHS will
enforce GINA protections when states fail to provide
equally strong protections.
The employment provisions in GINAwill be enforced by
the EEOC. Irene would need to obtain what is known as
a ‘‘right to sue’’ letter from EEOC in order to move forward
with a lawsuit against an employer.
Finally, if the discrimination occurred through her group
health plan at work, Irene should start with the DOL,
which has primary jurisdiction over employer health-ben-The Amerieﬁt plans: The Secretary of Labor has authority to ﬁne em-
ployer-sponsored health-beneﬁt plans that do not comply
with GINA. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has authority to assess tax penalties on employer-spon-
sored health-beneﬁt plans that do not comply with GINA.
Military Use of Genetic Information
As the use of genetic testing becomes widespread in civil-
ian society, the use of genetic testing and genetic informa-
tion by our military system is rapidly evolving. Service
members and their families rely on the Department of De-
fense (DoD) for employment, healthcare and for a variety
of health and disability beneﬁts. Although GINA does
not apply to the United States military, recent policy shifts
at DoD in many ways mirror the changes brought by
GINA. Currently, DoD collects and uses the genetic infor-
mation of service members in several ways. All U.S. service
members, including active duty and reserve military per-
sonnel, must provide a DNA sample that may be used to
identify their remains should they die in battle (see Armed
Forces Institute of Pathology database online).74,75 These
samples are housed in the Armed Forces Repository of
Specimen Samples for the Identiﬁcation of Remains. As
of 2002, the United States military’s DNA repository con-
tained 3.2 million samples.74 In general, retrieval and
analysis of these samples is performed only to identify
human remains. However, a provision in the 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act overrode the policy of allowing
access to the repository for limited law-enforcement
purposes.75 Since then, there has been some discussion of
whether the repository could or should be used for other
purposes, such as research.76 Soldiers have occasionally
challenged the requirement of providing a sample to the re-
pository, but federal courts have found that the mandatory
collection does not violate the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure.77 However,
individuals have the right to request that their samples be
destroyedwhen they conclude their relationship with DoD.
All individuals entering the military also receive genetic
tests for sickle cell anemia andG6PD (Glucose 6-phosphate
dehydrogenase) deﬁciency (M.H. Fries, personal commu-
nication).78 The military may use the test results to ensure
the safety of enlisted individuals by keeping them from
environments or jobs that are believed to trigger disease
or exacerbate health concerns. By determining such sus-
ceptibilities, the military hopes to prevent injury or disrup-
tion of duty.78 A positive test result for a genetic disorder is
noted on a service member’s dog tags and in his or her
medical records, which superiors consult before making as-
signments and promotions. For example, depending on
the branch of armed forces, persons who are sickle cell car-
riers or have sickle cell disease may opt out of service, be
excused from severe exertion, or be kept from assignments
involving high altitudes. They may wear special red sashes
or armbands during basic training to alert drill instructors
to their sensitivity to strenuous activity. Individuals with
G6PD deﬁciency are not assigned to locations that wouldcan Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, October 10, 2008 439
require them to take malaria medications because doing so
could lead to adverse events (M.H. Fries, personal commu-
nication).78 The initial medical exam administered to ser-
vice members also may identify a genetic or nongenetic
disorder that could be the basis for determining that they
are unﬁt for duty.
As genetic testing rapidly expands, with a wide range of
tests becoming available for a broad range of conditions, in
the future DoDmay consider using additional genetic test-
ing, particularly at enlistment. At a time when DoD is
struggling to maintain a strong and well-staffed military,
high-level ofﬁcials in the Pentagon with responsibility
for health policy have expressed at least a theoretical inter-
est in any tools that might help the services manage the
impact of common diseases such as diabetes, orthopedic
issues, and mental illness (e.g., post traumatic stress disor-
der and depression) (as discussed at a November 2007 DoD
meeting with the Genetics and Public Policy Center in Falls
Church, VA). AlthoughDoD is not pursuing genetic testing
in these areas currently, DoD ofﬁcials with whom we have
met acknowledge the impact that such diseases have on
maintaining stafﬁng and recognize the potential of effec-
tive and accurate genetic testing programs to alert them
to disease risks in service members.
There has been only limited examination of the criteria
the military uses to determine that an individual is not
ﬁt for duty, of genetic testing’s role in this process, or of
how these policies compare to policies applicable to civil-
ian employers. One recent signiﬁcant change in policy
concerns how the military uses genetic information for
beneﬁts determination.
Until March 2008, DoD had the following policy: Upon
entering active duty, service members are presumed to be
in sound physical and mental condition, except for any
medical defects and physical disabilities noted at the
time of entrance. After active duty commences, any injury
or disease discovered ‘‘is presumed to have been incurred
in the line of duty,’’ unless it results from the enlistee’s mis-
conduct or negligence. When injury or disease renders
service members unﬁt for duty, they receive a medical
discharge and disability beneﬁts, regardless of their length
of service.79
However, this policy excluded genetic diseases, stating,
‘‘Any injury or disease discovered after a Service member
enters active duty—with the exception of congenital and
hereditary conditions—is presumed to have been incurred
in the line of duty.’’80
Thus, in circumstances in which an active-duty service
member developed a disease with a known genetic basis,
the armed forces considered the genetic predisposition to
disease to be equivalent to a disease existing prior to service
and denied beneﬁts. An exception to the policy sometimes
was possible if the genetic disorder was aggravated by
military service.
In one case, a Marine Corps drill instructor who was
diagnosed with cancer after 15 years of service was denied
healthcare and disability beneﬁts after he was determined440 The American Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, Octobeto have Von Hippel-Lindau syndrome, a genetic condition.
Beneﬁts were reinstated once he successfully argued that
the underlying condition may have been exacerbated by
environmental exposures during his tours of duty.81 After
this case, DoD permitted beneﬁts to be awarded in cases
of genetic disease if a service member had completed at
least eight years of active duty.80
However, just as GINA has changed the landscape of ge-
netics for millions of civilians, service members leaving the
military because of a genetic disease now have better pro-
tection from genetic discrimination than under previous
policies. Changes have resulted from a combination of fac-
tors: a changed understanding of genetic science, shifting
policy terrain in the civilian world through passage of
GINA, public and media attention to this issue, political
pressures to improve healthcare for servicemembers gener-
ally, and the challenge of recruitment during wartime.
The key change is embedded in one section of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA).82
Section 1641 states that service members may bemedically
retired with beneﬁts if they have been in the military for
more than six months, and if ‘‘the disability was not noted
at the time of themember’s entrance on active duty (unless
compelling evidence or medical judgment is such to
warrant a ﬁnding that the disability existed before the
member’s entrance on active duty).’’82
Furthermore, in implementing the NDAA, new DoD
Instruction E3.P4.5.2.2. on ‘‘Hereditary and/or Genetic
Diseases’’ states, ‘‘Hereditary or genetic disease shall be
evaluated to determine whether compelling evidence or
medical judgment establishes that the disability was in-
curred prior to entry on active duty. However, even if the
conclusion is that the disability was incurred prior to entry
on active duty, any aggravation of that disease, incurred
while the member is entitled to basic pay, beyond that
determined to be due to natural progression shall be
determined to be service aggravated.’’83
The new policy has several important components. The
NDAA sets forth (in the title of Section 1641) an intention
to adopt the approach of the VA in establishing eligibility
for beneﬁts. In the case of hereditary and genetic disease,
the VA’s approach to administering healthcare beneﬁts to
millions of veterans has been particularly favorable to vet-
erans. The primary statute governing this issue for the VA,
38 USC x 1111, states, ‘‘Every veteran shall be taken to have
been in sound condition when examined, accepted, and
enrolled for service, except as to defects, inﬁrmities, or dis-
orders noted at the time of the examination, acceptance,
and enrollment, or where clear and unmistakable evidence
demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before
acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by
such service.’’84 Thus, it appears that in the VA health sys-
tem, an individual who develops a disease with a genetic
basis is not considered to have had a pre-existing condition
that renders him or her ineligible for beneﬁts. Additional
regulations and opinions from the VA’s Ofﬁce of General
Counsel (OGC) govern how this statute has beenr 10, 2008
interpreted. For example, in one case, the OGC issued an
opinion stating, ‘‘The mere genetic or other familial predis-
position to develop the symptoms, even if the individual is
almost certain to develop the condition at some time in his
or her lifetime, does not constitute having the disease.’’
The opinion also ﬁnds that only when an individual
develops symptoms or pathology ‘‘can he or she be said
to have developed the disease.’’ Ultimately, the opinion
holds that a hereditary disease does not always rebut the
presumption of soundness articulated in 38 USC x
1111.85 Thus, the explicit intent to adopt the approach
of the VA signals a signiﬁcant change by DoD. On a related
note, there are indications—including pending federal
legislation—that DoD will relinquish the responsibility of
beneﬁts determination entirely in the future, allowing VA
to do all beneﬁts determination.86,87
Under the NDAA and the new DoD Instructions, there is
a stronger presumption of ﬁtness at enrollment for people
with more than 180 days of service in all cases of illness.
Beneﬁts may not be denied unless the disability was actu-
ally noted at entry or ‘‘compelling evidence or medical
judgment’’ exists that the disability was incurred prior to
entry. This strong presumption holds true in the case of
hereditary and/or genetic disease as well.82,83 Service mem-
bers with more than eight years of service will continue to
be granted beneﬁts without any inquiry into the disease’s
existence at entry.
Finally, DoD policymakers are in the process of adding
language to the instruction that will include the following
clariﬁcation: ‘‘Findings will be made on the basis of objec-
tive evidence in the record as distinguished from personal
opinion, speculation, or conjecture. When the evidence is
not clear concerning whether the condition existed prior
to service or if the evidence is equivocal, the presumption
will not be deemed to have been rebutted and the mem-
ber’s condition will be found to have been incurred in
service.’’83
In sum, the new DoD policy appears to mean that if a
service member has served for at least six months and
develops a genetic (or any) condition or illness requiring
medical retirement, DoD will use the VA’s presumption
of sound condition upon enrollment and grant beneﬁts
unless compelling medical evidence exists to prove the
‘‘disability’’ existed at enrollment. It is our assumption
that the choice of the word ‘‘disability’’ is signiﬁcant be-
cause it suggests that a mere genetic marker without symp-
toms is not enough to rebut the presumption of sound
condition—an actual disability (i.e., symptoms and/or
impairment) would be required.
It will be important to see how DoD implements and
monitors the new policy and its effects and to what extent
implementationmirrors implementation of GINA. In addi-
tion, additional study is needed of current and future po-
tential uses of genetic testing by DoD. The more generous
separation policy may increase pressure for additional uses
of genetic testing at enlistment and in health care during
active duty: DoD now may have a stronger ﬁnancial inter-The Americest in excluding from service those individuals who are
likely to develop genetic illness. New enlistees will not
necessarily be permitted to serve if they do not consent
to whatever genetic testing DoD deems appropriate and
useful.
There also may be increased interest in conducting
research on active duty and retired military personnel to
better understand what genetic markers are linked to those
diseases that have the greatest impact on military readi-
ness, such as PTSD and depression.88,89 Interest in study-
ing the genetic and environmental contributors to these
common diseases among service members could result in
renewed interest in the samples available from the Armed
Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identiﬁca-
tion of Remains.
There are of course beneﬁcent reasons to increase test-
ing, such as to protect individual service members from
avoidable harm. And given current shortages in stafﬁng
and enrollment, there will be reluctance to utilize ques-
tionable genetic testing that would weed out potential
servicemembers unnecessarily. It is not clear how the iden-
tiﬁcation of genetic contributors to common complex
diseases will affect the interpretation and imposition of
military policies. Many common complex diseases have
both genetic and environmental contributors. How the
military will assess these factors and whether it would try
to distinguish between environmental exposures prior to
and during service is unknown.
Conclusion: What’s Next?
Enactment of GINA and recent changes in military policy
for the use of genetic information in awarding beneﬁts
reﬂect society’s growing understanding of the importance
of fair policies for the use of information revealed through
genetic research and medicine. GINA is a ﬁrst step: Future
policy work will need to examine closely the issues that
remain, such as the potential for genetic information to
be used to deny people life insurance, disability insurance,
and long-term-care insurance. Similarly, although changes
inDoD regulations are encouraging in establishing rules for
fair use of genetics in beneﬁts determinations by theUnited
Statesmilitary, questions remain as to how themilitary will
use geneticmedicine overall andwhat the potential impact
will be.
Most immediately, researchers, providers, and patients,
as well as health insurers and employers, need to under-
stand their new rights and responsibilities under GINA.
Overall, we believe that individuals considering genetic
testing as a part of clinical care or research should feel reas-
sured, yet should also understand that there are limits to
GINA’s scope. As we move forward and regulations imple-
menting GINA are ﬁnalized, additional public education
will be necessary, and researchers, clinicians, and institu-
tional review boards will need more information about
how tomanage genetic information and how to communi-
cate the risks and beneﬁts of genetic testing. Our collective
future work will continue as we strive to create thean Journal of Human Genetics 83, 435–444, October 10, 2008 441
foundation necessary for genetic medicine and genetic re-
search to thrive.
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